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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW[
The questioned provisions regarding insurance must be tested and
scrutinized by able administration, as should determination of rates.
For only by experience and more complete statistics can it be de-
termined what is fair for both borrowers and lenders of this
region.8 3  Indeed, this is the heart of effective regulation of con-
sumer finance: able administration ' coupled with the development
of an enlightened industry which disciplines and advances itself
into a financial institution rather than an economic blight."'
While North Dakota can look with a good measure of pride on its
new legislation, it should be noted that those who are considered
"thinkers" in the field advocate the formulation of a consumer credit
code8 6 abolishing the gaps and inconsistencies of separate and not
always coordinated pieces of legislative enactment. If this then be
the direction of the future it must be seriously considered by for-
ward looking lawmakers.
J. PHILLIP JOHNSON.
SEARCH AND SEIZURES: 1960
The right of freedom from unreasonable search and seizure has
always been one of the cornerstones of the American constitutional
system. In 1960 the Supreme Court of the United States handed
down three decisions that profoundly affected this fundamental
principle of law. On the one hand the Court substantially strength-
ened the protection of the Fourth Amendment so far as state offi-
cers are concerned by repudiating the so-called "silver platter" doc-
trine,' under which evidence obtained by these officers in an illegal
fashion was nonetheless admissible in the federal courts. Conversely
the decisions upholding the right of compulsory inspection by state
83. See Miller, The Economics of Fair Charges, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 274 (1951). The small
loan laws are virtually alone in requiring that all charges be denominated interest. Other
lending agencies charge the ordinary contract rate of interest and charge separately for
services.
84. See Sullivan, Administration of a Regulatory Small Loan Law, 8 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 146 (1941). While the North Dakota act went into effect in July 1960 it was not
until August that funds were available for administration, leaving issuance of licenses until
October. Letter from Alf Hager, Deputy Examiner, Small Loans Division, Oct. 31, 190.
85. Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan Laws, 8 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 108, 126 (1941) "Morality has been achieved in this business not by the mere
passage of a law but by fostering a remedial business which, from enlightened self interest
polices its own area with everlasting vigilance and vigor."; Redfield, The Responsibility of
all Consumer Lending Agencies to Help Eliminate the Loan Shark Evil, 19 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 104 (1954).
86. Henderson, The Future of the Loan Shark and Consumer Credit Agencies, 19 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 127 (1954); Hubachek, The Drift Toward a Consumer Credit Code,
16 U. Chi. L. R, 609 (1949).
1. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1948). Stated "The crux of that doctrine
is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search
by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal
authorities on a silver platter" (Felix Frankfurter for the majority).
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health and safety officers appear to have weakened the coverage of
the Fourth Amendment in important respects as evidenced in Ohio
ex. rel Eaton v. Price.2
Admissibility of evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure
is a problem that has plagued the Supreme Court for 75 years. The
Court's progression seems to have finally been resolved in the de-
cisions of Elkins v. United States3 and Rios v. United States.4 These
are parallel cases in theory, though factually distinguishable and
represent a summation of the Supreme Court's view on admissibility
today.
In the Rios case5 the defendant was observed in a cab by two
Los Angeles police officers who followed him in an unmarked car.
They had no reason to suspect him of anything illegal except that
the neighborhood had a reputation for narcotics activity. They
stopped the defendant on a ruse of a routine inquiry. There was
conflicting testimony as to the events that followed but neverthe-
less the defendant dropped a package of heroin on the floor of the
cab as he attempted to get out and it was seized by the policemen
who then apprehended Rios. The Superior Court of Los Angeles
quashed the indictment on the grounds that the search was un-
constitutional and therefore illegal.6 The facts were then disclosed
to the federal authorities who indicted Rios. On a proper motion
by the defendant to suppress evidence the Federal District Court
expressed the opinion, based on the transcript of the state court pro-
cedings and additional testimony of the two police officers at their
hearing, that the officers had obtained the evidence lawfully and as
a result the seizure was permissive. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Stewart,7 held that the validity of the search which resulted in the
seizure of narcotics must be determined upon the narrow question
of when the arrest occurred and the answer depends on an evalu-
ation of all the facts which had not been made when the trial court
expressed its opinion. The unresolved question then was: "inde-
pendently of the state court's determination was the evidence used
against the petitioner in the federal prosecution obtained in viola-
tion of his rights under the Constitution of the United States?"
In Elkins v. United States,' the defendant's were convicted of in-
2. 80 S.Ct. 1463 (1960).
3. 80 S.Ct. 1437 (1960).
4. 80 S.Ct. 1431 (1960).
5. The case of Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Prempted
the Rios Case with the same holding on the Cricuit Court level.
6. Based on Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 836 (West 1954).
7. Justices, Frankfurter, Clark, Hartan, and Whittaker dissented.
8. 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1958) at appelate level.
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tercepting and recording wire communications and divulging such
communications of conspiracy to violate the Communcations Act.'
The sole issue there was: "If the evidence was unlawfully obtained
was such evidence admissible in the federal prosecution of the de-
fendant because it was obtained by state officers without federal
participation." The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Stewart, held that
where evidence is obtained by state officers during a search which,
if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defend-
ant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment, the evidence procured thereby is inadmissible
in Federal Court.10
I. HISTORY OF ADMISSIBILITY
At common law the method used in obtaining evidence did not
affect its admissibility." The first major decision was that of
Boyd v. Unted States12 which held that compulsory extortion of a
man's personal papers to be used in evidence against him for con-
viction is in essence a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 This
broad pronouncement gave the Fourth Amendment substantially
the same meaning with regard to the use of evidence illegally ob-
tained.14 The resulting principle is that the Fourth Amendment is
violated where the defendant is searched illegally and the evidence
is later used against him.
Nineteen years later the Court seemingly contradicted the Boyd
case in Adams v. New York-s when the Court said that as long as
the evidence seized is pertinent to an issue in the case, it does not
matter from what source the evidence had been derived. The Court
thus took a 180 degree turn from its previous decision and returned
to the common law principles.
In 1914 the principles that were laid down in the Boyd case were
crystalized by Weeks v. United States 6 which established the ex-
clusionary rule which keeps out of federal court, evidence obtained
9. 18 U.S.C.A.; Communications Act of 1934.
10. Justices, Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker again dissented vigorously.
11. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3rd ed. 1940).
12. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
13. U.S.C.A. Amend. 4.
14. In so far as it was held that the product of an illegal search was inadmissible, it was
impliedly discredited by the opinion in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), which
though distinguishable as a review of state action gave wholesale approval to the tradi-
tional doctrines of the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
15. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
16. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). To the exclusionary rule of the Weeks case there has been
unquestioning adherence for almost a half a century. See Silverthorne Lumler Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1919); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920);
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344.(1930); Grau v. United
States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1952).
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by Federal agents in violation of the defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment. However, evidence obtained from an illegal
search, is nevertheless admissible in a federal court, where the
search was made for the purpose of enforcing state law and done by
state officers. An anomalous situation was then created where in
one instance evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and
seizure by federal officers was inadmissible but the same evidence
could be secured by state officers and its admissibility was beyond
question . 7 This dichotomy was affirmed and qualified by Byars v.
United States" to the effect that there could be no collusion be-
tween state and federal officers in the search and seizure. In the
same year this holding was extended by Gambino v. United States"0
which held that evidence obtained solely by a state officer, but for
the exclusive use of a federal officer was also inadmissible. The dis-
tinguishing feature being that the Weeks holding was on the basis
that the search was for the purpose of enforcing state and not fed-
eral law.
The effect of the Fourth Amendment then is to put the courts of
the United States and their officials, in the exercise of their power
under certain limitations as to the exercise of such, and to secure the
people and their property against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of the law.
The distinction between the constitutional rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments was further contrasted in Wolf v.
Colorado.20 The majority approved prior decisions 2' holding that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not in-
corporate all the provisions of the first eight amendments but only
those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty".22
17. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1919), Holmes J.,
in language often quoted said, "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used be-
fore the court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the
facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by
the government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
18. 273 U.S. 28 (1927); aff'd in Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
19. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
20. 333 U.S. 879 (1948).
21. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883); Tvining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908); Palko v. Connecticuit, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
22. It cannot be doubted, that the majority speaking through Justice Frankfurter, took
cognizance of People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). There
Cardozo Jr. said "No doubt there would be greater protection for the individaul if evidence
illegally obtained by state officers in state court were not admissible. But can we say
the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered? The question is whether
this protection would not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society.
On the one hand there is the social need that crime should" be repressed. On the other,
the social need that law should not be flouted by the insolence of the office. There are
dangers in either choice. The rule [of admissibility] strikes a balance between thes oppos-
ing in terests. We must hold it to be the law until those organs of government by which a
1961] NOTES
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The application of the Fourteenth Amendment was further con-
strued in Rochin v. California.23 and Irvine v. California.24  In the
Rochin case police officers forced the extraction of morphine cap-
sules from the defendant's stomach.2 5 The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of the state court because these methods of procure-
ment were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The dis-
tinguishing feature between the Rochin and Wolf decisions was the
interpretation by the court that the methods used were "offensive
to a sense of justice". Therefore the outlying principle set up is
that though a search and seizure may be admissible if illegal it can-
not be so if the methods used are of a physically coercive and ab-
horrent nature. The Irvine case falls within the twilight zone be-
tween the Wolf and Rochin decisions. There officers set up micro-
phones in the defendant's home unknown to him and the testimony
of the conversations taped by the officers was allowed. While the
majority opinion recognized that under the Wolf case the security
of privacy from arbitrary intrustion by the police is within the con-
cept of "due process" of the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless
it took into account also that under the Wolf case the Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid evidence obtained by an illegal search
and seizure from being admissible in state courts.
An attempt to bring the case within the doctrine of the Rochin
decision was rejected by the court on the ground that here the
essential features of coercion were lacking. This coercion feature
likewise accounted for the difference in the Rochin and Wolf de-
cisions: "However obnoxious are the facts in the case before us,
they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality to the person,
but rather a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping." Moreover
the Court rejected the suggestion that the Wolf case was more sus-
ceptible of differentiation as the invasion of privacy was more
shocking and more offensive than the one involved there. "Limiting
the application of the Rochin case to instances of 'mild' shock would
leave the rule therein laid down too indefinite of application."
In Benati v. United States26 the issue was whether evidence ob-
change of public policy is normally affected shall give notice to the courts that the change
has come to pass.' North Dakota has held similarly in State v. Pauley, 49 N.D. 488,
192 NW. 91 (1923) (making liquor illegally; utensils were found in the search of a
house without a warrant); State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925); aff'd in
State v. Lacey, 55 N.D. 83, 212 N.W. 442 (1927). In State v. Nagel, 28 N.W.2d
665. 667 (N.D. 1947) the court impliedly affirmed, State v. Pauley, supra and State v.
Fahn, supra.
23. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
24. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
25. At 165 Justice Frankfurter stated, "They are inethods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentation."
26. 355 U.S. 96, 102 (1957).
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tained by state officers through wire tapping, which is a Federal
crime,27 is admissible in Federal court. The court held the evidence
inadmissiblo but the decision has given rise to argument as to the
converse situation. This then seems to say that if evidence of wire
tapping obtained illegally by state officers is inadmissible in Fed-
eral court, it would be just as reasonable to say evidence of illegal
search and seizure by state officers will be admissible.
A forerunner of the Rios and Elkins decisions was Rea v. United
States28 where it was held that evidence illegally obtained by a
federal officer could not be used as evidence in a state court. The
majority opinion relied on an injunction directed to the officer
compelling him not to testify .The injunction seems to rest on the
Court's general supervisory powers over federal law enforcement
agencies. 29
It was with this background that the Supreme Court of the
United States finally resolved the issues presented by history in the
joint decisions of Rios v. United States and Elkins v. United States.
"Courts proceed step by step," Justice Holmes once said. 3  The
history of illegally obtained evidence has had an innocous begin-
ning starting with the proposition that the method of securing evi-
dence was not a factor in determining the merits of its admissibility.
Rios and Elkins have finally resolved the uncertainties of the
past by ruling that evidence obtained illegally by state officers is in-
admissible in federal court. It is now up to the Federal Courts to
rule in the first instance whether the evidence was procured in
contravention of a person's constitutional rights. Whether this hold-
ing will stand the test of time, no one knows. Since it appears that
our constitutional liberties are being further extended, it would be
a step backwards to stray from the path of our present holdings. 31
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN RELATION TO INSPECTION STATUTES
It is strange that the Supreme Court should constrict the applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment in relation to personal rights of
privacy so shortly after its liberalization in the prior decisions of
27. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
28. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
29. "In this posture we have seen then that a case raises not a constitutional question
but one concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies." Citing
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
30. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
31. In United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945) the reason for the
rule of excluding illegally obtained evidence was aptly put by Hand L. Circuit Judge when
he said, "The reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been un-
lawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitu-
tional privilege. In earlier times an action of trespass against the offending official may
have been enough protection but that is no longer true. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
that wrong be suppressed."
1961]
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Rios and Elkins. Due to the complexities of urbanization, inspec-
tion statutes are becoming more prevalent. The contention is made,
that entries which are authorized without a search warrent are in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Generally this has been refuted,
but not with the detrimental effect of the recent decision, Ohio ex.
rel Eaton v. Price.3 2 The facts were that Dayton, Ohio, had a city
ordinance authorizing health and safety inspections of private resi-
dences by inspectors who were required to show proper identifica-
tion and conduct inspections at a reasonable hour. Defendant re-
fused to permit safety inspectors to enter his home and make an
inspection on the ground they had no search warrent and were
thus engaged in an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. He was convicted and fined for
breach of the ordinance. The Supreme Court of the United States
held, four Justices dissenting, that the statute was constitutional.
The case is a corollary adjudication to Frank v. Maryland,33
which upheld the constitutionality of a basically similar Maryland
statute authorizing inspection of private premises by public health
officers engaged in enforcing health laws. The essential difference
between the two cases are primarily factual. In the Frank case, the
health inspectors appeared to have probable cause for desiring to
make a search; they were looking for a nest of disease-bearing
rodents in the neighborhood, and the dilapidated condition of the
dwelling house plus evidence of the presence of rodents was visable
to the eye.3 4 In the instant case, no such probable cause was proven
and the demand for inspection of the premises was made on a "spot
check" or "area check" basis."
Thus from Frank to Eaton a substantial expansion of the per-
missible grounds of inspection is already visible.31
In other states there might be some question as to whether the
violation of such a local ordinance would result in civil or criminal
liability3 7 North Dakota adjudications indicate that proceedings of
32. 80 S. Ct. 1463 (1960).
33. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
34. The applicable part of the Frank statute reads, "That there shall be probable cause
as shown by valid grounds that suspicion of a nuisance exists before entry shall be made."
35. The applicable part of the Ohio statute reads, "For the purpose of making inspec-
tions [the inspector must show] appropriate identification, and survey at a reasonable
hour."
36. In Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 631 (1925), Brandies, J., dissenting,
"It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the progress of inclusion and exclusion,
so often used in the developing of a certain rule is not allowed to end with its bmunciation
and that expression in an opinion yields later to the mipact of facts unforseen."
37. State ex, rel Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 70, 28 N.W.2d 345 (1947); Keefe v.
Colorado, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906) (holding it must be civil); Komen v. St.
Louis 316 Mo. 9, 289 S.W. (1925); Straus v. State, Tex Crim 132, 173 S.W. 663 (1915)
(holding that it is criminal).
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the type found in the principal case would probably be deemed to
involve criminal liability,!,' and that the constitutional protections
surrounding defendants in criminal actions would thus be appli-
cable. However, the constitutional problem is much the same in
either instance, since the protection of the Fourth Amendment
is not limited to criminal prosecutions. The Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to protect the individual from unnecessary in-
visions of his right of privacy in his own home. Thus it was said
by Judge Prettyman in District of Columbia v. Little,"5 that "The
basic premise of the prohibition against searches and seizures was
not the protection against self incrimination; it was the right of
every man to privacy in his own home." Judge Prettyman added
that the protection of the Fourth Amendment extended alike against
health inspectors and police officers.
In support of the validity of such statutes the argument is some-
times made that there is a distinction between a search of premises,
as regulated by the Fourth Amendment, and a mere investigation
as permitted by the statutes. The theory is that a search involves
looking for something which is capable of seizure, while an investi-
gation is merely a looking around, as in checking over premises.4"
But it would seem that the latter and broader type of inquiry is even
more dangerous to privacy and security.4 ' Moreover, it is possible
-as the dissenting opinion in the Price case pointed out-that vali-
dation of an unrestricted right of inspection by local officials will
permit harrassment of citizens who are unpopular with the local
administration, through inspections repeatedly conducted out of
spite or similar unworthy motives.
It is true, of course, that constitutional rights are relative rather
than absolute, 42 and the process of constitutional adjudication is
marked by a weighing of conflicting social values: e. g., the benefits
from enforcement of an individual right of privacy must be weighed
against the benefits to be derived from enforcement of health reg-
ulations. Moreover, the protection of the Fourth Amendment is not
against all searches but only such as are unreasonable.4- Thus a
search warrant is not needed, for instance, to authorize a search as
38. Strong dicta in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
39. 178 F.2d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
40. State v. Armeno, 29 R.I. 431, 72 AtI. 216 (1909).
41. See Sullivan v. Brawner, 237 Ky. 730, 36 S.W.2d 364 (1934).
42. Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918); This is Justice Holmes famous de-
cision that you cannot yell fire in a crowded theater. Aff'd by: Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1918) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941).
43. Elkins v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 1431 (1960).
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an incident of a valid arrest.44 And it is also true that municipal
ordinances pertaining to such matters as plumbing and sewage dis-
posal,"5 housing inspection'46 and food inspection 47 cannot be effec-
tively administered without inspection. Thus the Price case would
seem open to criticism not on the ground it validates such inspec-
tions, but because of the lack of substantive" as well as procedural4 9
protection given to the private citizen by the ordinances in question.
No advance notice is given before the inspection; no showing of
probable cause was made in the Price case; 0 and the only safe-
guards are that the inspectors must show proper credentals and
make the inspection at a reasonable hour. In such a situation an
obvious danger arises that police officers who would not be entitled
to a search warrant because of lack of evidence will, in effect, be
enabled to carry out general searches indirectly through collusion
with health inspectors. Indeed, in many instances peace officers are
themselves designated as inspecting officers; and it may be antici-
pated that serious questions may arise involving the duality of the
officer's status, i. e., is he inspecting as a health officer or as a peace
officer? 51
III. CONCLUSION
North Dakota has no cases on this particular point. A few statutes
nevertheless provide for inspections by peace officers and others in
the enforcement of statutes relating to child labor and wages and
hours.12  Suppose such an inspection turned up evidence of a differ-
ent offense? In the light of Elkins v. United States, which holds in-
44. Unted States v. Rabinokitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). This rule is consistent with the
well established proposition that constitutional safeguards are not absolute and must some-
time yield to a greater public interest.
45. Commonwealth v. Dourghty, 156 Pa. Super. 520, 40 A.2d 902 (1945).
46. Savage v. District of Columbia, 54 A.2d 562 (D.C. 1948).
47. Keiper v. Louicville, 152 Ky. 691, 154 S.W. 18 (1913).
48. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948).
49. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
50. Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, 80 S.Ct. 1463, 1467 (1960). This is the major point
of contrast with the Frank case.
51. The use of health inspections as a means for obtaining evidence to a cri'me may be
encouraged by the Frank and Eaton decisions. The Baltimore police did not wait long to
try that device. In State v. Pettiford, Baltimore Superior Bench, 28 U.S.L. Week 2286
(Dec. 1959) a police officer assigned to the sanitation division, had utilized the power of
entry granted by the city health ordinance (City Code art. 12, § 120) to gain entry to a
house, observe an illegal lottery, and then to signal a waiting vice-squad officer. The court
ruled that Wolf v. Colorado required that the evidence be excluded, for the exception to
Wolf created by Frank is not used to cover searches without warrants inconsistant with
the conceptions of human rights embodied in our State and Federal Constitutions.
Thus convictions obtained as a result of these novel "searches" for criminal evidence
may not stand in the face of collaboration between police and health officers, at least
where conviction is by a federal court. This in no way affects state or city convictions
and where the exclusionary rule is in effect obtaining proof of collaboration would be very
difficult, for it is likely that most police techniques utilizing this new approach will be
more sophisticated than the feeble attempt made by the Baltimore police.
52. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 34-07-01; 34-0702.
admissible in federal prosecutions evidence illegally obtained by
state officials, a complex issue of legality of the inspection might be
presented to the federal courts. At present however, it seems
reasonably clear no such argument would succeed in keeping the
evidence out of a state prosecution following the non-exclusionary
rule. While a state may not pursue an affirmative policy of violating
the Fourth Amendment, admission of such evidence in state prose-
cutions is still permissible."a
JOHN L. PLATTNER
JAMES DILLARD.
53. State v. Fahn, -53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925); State v. Pauley, 49 N.D. 488,
192 N.W. 91 (1923).
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